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ABSTRACT
Latin America began the twentieth century as a relatively poor region on the periphery of the world
economy.  One cause of a low level of income per person was capital scarcity.  Long run growth via capital
deepening requires either the mobilization of domestic capital through savings, or large inflows of foreign
capital.  Latin America’s capital inflows were large by global standards at the century’s turn, and even up
to the 1930s.  But after the 1930s, Latin America was not so favored by foreign capital as compared with
other peripheral regions–for example, the Asian economies.  The Great Depression is conventionally
depicted as a turning point in Latin America for commercial policy and protectionism, thus marking the
onset of import substitution and a long-run increase in barriers in international goods markets.  However,
this paper argues that policy responses in the 1930s, and subsequent decades of relative economic
retardation, can be better understood as the cause and effect of the creation of long-run barriers in
international capital markets.  To support this notion, I discuss the quantitative extent of these barriers and
their effects on economic growth.  As for causality, I argue that the political economy of institutional
changes in the 1930s in the periphery might be understood in similar terms to those economic historians
have used to discuss the macroeconomic crisis in the core.  Such a political-economy model might thus
have universal (rather than core-specific) use.  It might predict the “reactive” and “passive” responses by
periphery countries to external shocks, and the persistence of such shocks in the postwar period.  In
conclusion, I touch on the important implications of these ideas for the current situation in Latin America,
where recent policy reforms aim to undo the last sixty years of isolation and reintegrate Latin America into
the global economy.







Economic Growth and Foreign Capital in Latin America since 1900
To the extent that studies of long-run economic growth have touched on Latin America, it has
usually been to depict a peripheral region that has experienced divergence rather than convergence
in terms of its income level relative to the core economies.
1 Inevitably, the region—like the rest of
the periphery—could not match the core during the initial burst of the Industrial Revolution in early
19th century Europe and North America. But as global markets developed in the 19th century, and
as labor, capital, and technology migrated between countries ever more freely, some economies at
the periphery seemed poised to experience a long awaited catching up.
2 Unfortunately, after 1914,
the experience of two world wars and a Great Depression wrecked much of that global economy,
and, with it, some argue, the chances for convergence that seemed so likely before 1914. Only
recently has a rebuilt global economy started to reemerge from the various crises and aftershocks of
the twentieth century.
3
It is one task of economic historians to document these times, and provide some measure of
explanation for the economic, political, and institutional changes that defined them. For variety and
volatility of economic experience in this century, no region can surpass—and therefore perhaps no
region can be more instructive—than Latin America. Latin America began the twentieth century as a
follower, a relatively poor region on the periphery of the world economy, but it ended the twentieth
century even further behind the leaders. Examine Table 1 and Figure 1. Today’s best estimates of
historical trends in income show that in 1900 Latin America’s average level of income per capita
was well below that of the leading economies of the core, comprising the countries in Europe, North
America, and the modern OECD. Some countries in the region were much richer than others,
however, and countries with nascent industrial sectors and other signs of modernization had a
narrower income gap. For example, the settler economies of Chile and Argentina, and Mexico,
which, after sluggish growth for much of the nineteenth century, had grown rapidly in the
Porfiriato.
4
1 The pre-modern origins of this relative backwardness are discussed in Coatsworth (1993; 1998) and in the
essays in the edited volume by Haber (1997a). For a discussion of the persistence of this backwardness in the mid to
late 20th century see Taylor (1998).
2 A good example would be Argentina, perhaps the most infamous case of economic development potential
unfulfilled. See Taylor (1992; 1994b; 1994a).
3 See Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), Maddison (1991), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Williamson (1996).
4 As noted by Coatsworth (1993; 1998), it is inappropriate to speak of Latin America falling behind in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a uniform and homogeneous feature of the region. Some countries fell far
behind, like Mexico and Brazil, motivating the title of Haber (1997a). Others had decent growth performance,
compared to much of Europe, if not to the “exceptionalism” of the United States, and even caught up with the core
economies, Argentina being just the finest example. Thus, the idea that colonial institutions or factor endowments
ensured some deterministic, path-dependent, or path-influenced descent into underdevelopment for the region as a
whole requires careful consideration when pursued on a country-by-country basis. Spatial and temporal variation in
economic performance was considerable (Engerman and Sokoloff. 1997; North1990). The same is true of the2
The overall picture of Latin American development began to change after 1929, and more
dramatically after 1950 and during the postwar period.
5 The region’s economies started to
experience slower rates of growth on average as compared to the rest of the world, notably relative
to the core and to certain fast growing Asian economies; these differential growth rates implied a
falling behind, or divergence, in levels of income per capita. In 1900, the Latin American income
level was well above that in Asia, and stood at 41% of the OECD core. In 1950, Latin American
GDP per capita was 45% of the OECD core level and more than three times the Asian average. But
by the 1980s Latin America had fallen back to less than one third the OECD level, and was being
approached and overtaken by parts of Asia. This 20th century relative retardation and slump in
living standards is Latin America’s burden of history, and remains a central, burning issue in the
region’s political, social, and economic landscape. And in countries that have fallen a great distance
in economic terms, such as Argentina, once one of the richest economies in the world circa 1900,
the burden is great indeed. Unraveling this history and identifying the lessons for today are key
challenges for social scientists studying the region.
One obvious way to approach the study of Latin America’s growth performance is via the
theory and empirics of economic growth. My preference here is to begin with the simplest, and, its
proponents still say, the most relevant model of growth as applied to modern experience: the
neoclassical theory of growth due to Robert Solow.
6 It is a theory centered on the accumulation of
capital: a low level of income per person is essentially a result of capital scarcity. The production
function for output is of the form Y = AK
aL
1–a. For a given technology A, and labor force L,
improvements in output per worker (Y/L) = (K/L)
a are driven by increases in the capital-labor ratio
(K/L).
This process of capital deepening requires, in conventional cases of constant or expanding
labor force L, some capital accumulation (increases in K, ∆K > 0). Accumulation occurs via
investment (∆K = INVESTMENT), that is, by the expansion in the quantity of machines,
equipment, durable producer goods, land improvements, infrastructure, and so on.
7
twentieth century, when still more candidates for causes of underdevelopment can be identified, such as the
rejection of openness in trade and capital markets as discussed below, despite the region’s very open stance since the
colonial era.
5 The standard reference is Díaz Alejandro (1984a; 1984b), who identified 1929 as the major turning point,
though not the only one. For an analysis that extends to the present day see Taylor (1998).
6 The seminal piece is Solow (1956). For a survey of endogenous growth and its empirical relevance see Romer
(1994) and Pack (1994). Proponents of the neoclassical model include Mankiw (1995) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995).
7 The neoclassical model is simple to extend to embrace the notion of human capital accumulation to include
skills, knowledge and research.3
Table 1
Income Per Capita, 1900–1990
GDP per capita in 1980 international dollars
1900 1913 1929 1950 1973 1987
Argentina 1,284 1,770 2,036 2,324 3,713 3,302
Brazil 436 521 654 1,073 2,504 3,417
Chile 956 1,255 1,928 2,350 3,309 3,393
Colombia 610 801 975 1,395 2,318 3,027
Mexico 649 822 835 1,169 2,349 2,667
Peru 624 819 890 1,349 2,357 2,380
Latin American Average 760 998 1,220 1,610 2,758 3,031
Asian Average 485 539 601 505 1,061 1,952
NICs Average 492 532 690 545 1,939 4,444
OECD Average 1,817 2,224 2,727 3,553 7,852 10,205
Notes NICs refers to Newly Industrialized Countries; in Maddison’s database Taiwan and South Korea.
Source: Maddison (1989).
Figure 1













Notes: Chart shows GDP per capita in 1980 international dollars.
Source: Table 1.4
The neoclassical growth model remains one of the most robust explanations for economic
growth in the twentieth century, both for wide cross sections of countries, and for Latin America
itself.
8 However, I especially want to appeal to its relevance in a global economy context, with
potentially open economies embedded in world markets. Although, in its original form, the model
applied to a closed economy, where investment equals savings, its implications for an open
economy are easily derived.
9 In an open economy we must direct our attention to two sources of
capital. Accumulation of capital requires either the mobilization of domestic capital through savings,
or large inflows of foreign capital.
10 In simple terms,
INVESTMENT = DOMESTIC SAVINGS + FOREIGN SAVINGS;
that is, every dollar used in investment has to be financed, either by domestic agents sacrificing
consumption and generating a surplus of savings, or by foreigners willing to do likewise.
Thus, if we can explain changes in investment via changes in the incentives or barriers for
accumulation, and so account for the responses of domestic and foreign savings, we have a
potentially useful theory of long-run growth in a world of open, or even imperfectly open,
economies. The simplest data from Latin America’s twentieth century history offers at least prima
facie evidence that the degree of integration in world capital markets (or, conversely, the extent of
barriers or imperfections in such markets) were somehow related to economic growth
performance.
11 Examine Table 2 and Figure 2. For example, during a period of respectable
economic performance before the Great Depression, Latin America’s capital inflows were large by
global standards: very large before 1914, and still substantial even up to the 1930s. But after the
1930s, Latin America received relatively less foreign capital than other peripheral regions, for
example, as compared to the Asian economies, most of whom, as we saw above, exhibited much
faster postwar economic growth than the Latin American group.
8 Influential empirical papers supporting the model came from Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992). For a large body of empirical results, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). A thorough
sensitivity analysis was offered by Levine and Renelt (1992), emphasizing the robustness of the investment-
growth relationship. I have found the neoclassical approach useful as a means to study long-run economic growth
in the case of Argentina (Taylor 1994b; 1994a) and the region as a whole (Taylor 1998), with similar emphasis on
investment as a major source of growth.
9 A basic open economy model is presented in Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
10 A national income identity implies that GDP or output (Q) and imports (M) may be allocated for private
consumption spending (C), private investment spending (I), government spending (G), and exports (X). Thus Q +
M = C + I + G + X. Adding to both sides of this equality net factor income from abroad, for simplicity interest
payments (rB) from net claims on foreigners (B) bearing interest (r), and rearranging, we obtain an expression for
GNP (Y), Y = Q + rB = C + I + G + (X–M) + rB. The latter two terms are the external balance, or balance on the
current account, CA = (X – M) + rB, equal to the trade balance plus non-trade net income from abroad. Rearranging
we obtain the current account identity, CA = S – I; S is savings, S = Y – C – I – G. An inflow of capital occurs when
CA is negative, and we may define foreign savings (or net foreign investment) as SF = NFI = –CA. Thus, I = S + SF.
11 For an exhaustive study of long-run movements of capital flows in the world economy, we are indebted here
to the work of Twomey (1998).5
Table 2
Foreign Investment in Latin America and Asia, 1900–1990
1900 1914 1929 1938 1950 1970 1980 1990
Foreign Investment/GDP
Argentina 4.15 2.60 1.12 0.87 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.64
Brazil 2.55 2.96 0.92 0.70 0.18 0.17 0.32 0.36
Chile 1.88 2.11 1.56 1.63 0.49 0.38 0.27 0.40
Colombia 0.74 0.27 0.34 0.35 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.21
Mexico 1.55 1.83 1.28 0.79 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.32
Peru 1.78 1.21 0.64 0.46 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.48
Uruguay 3.14 1.62 0.67 0.59 0.18 0.13 — 0.31
Venezuela 2.52 0.98 1.05 0.73 0.55 0.36 0.32 0.47
India 0.25 0.34 0.30 0.45 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.25
Indonesia 0.62 0.95 1.11 1.29 — 0.29 0.66 1.68
Malaysia — 1.48 1.04 0.79 — 0.33 0.29 0.58
Philippines — 0.17 0.22 — — 0.34 0.29 0.58
Thailand — 0.38 0.35 0.30 — 0.16 0.21 0.33
Notes: For Argentina and Uruguay, 1990 column shows 1989 data.
Source: Twomey (1998).
Figure 2
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Source: Table 2, simple unweighted averages.6
From this introductory review of the macroeconomic historical evidence two things stand
out. First, that since the early years of the century Latin American growth performance has been
disappointing, exhibiting retardation relative to the core, especially after the 1930s. Second, we also
find evidence that foreign capital, though it retreated in importance in many countries in the autarkic
years after the 1930s, apparently retreated further and faster in the case of Latin America. What
remains to be asked is what causal connections exist between these two correlated events. My
analysis centers on an examination of interventions in international markets that affected the
integration of Latin America in the global economy. Since my focus is the capital market, it is
natural to begin with a discussion of the emergence of explicit capital controls. In the next section I
trace the emergence of capital controls in the 1930s, and their subsequent evolution and pervasive
effects on investment prices and quantities—and thus, growth—in the postwar period.
The Great Depression as a Watershed in Capital Markets
The Great Depression is conventionally depicted as a turning point in Latin America for commercial
policy and protectionism, and as marking the onset of import substitution and a long-run increase in
barriers in international goods markets. This perspective is evident in almost all works, and the
discussion of trade distortions is now standard textbook material.
12 I will not argue that this
description is incorrect, but rather incomplete, and that a complementary analysis exists with a quite
different emphasis on capital markets. Moreover, in terms of economic theories of long-run growth,
this new emphasis offers what I will argue is a clearer and more plausible explanation for the
dynamic losses involved in the relative slow-down and divergence of the region’s economies.
13
Thus, this paper argues that the policy response of the 1930s, and the subsequent economic
retardation, can be better understood as the cause and effect of the creation of long-run barriers in
international capital markets. The argument will proceed in the present section in three parts.
Firstly, I will discuss the emergence of capital controls in the 1930s as the prototypical or
archetypal market intervention that set the stage for later distortions in the capital market price
system in Latin American economies. This requires an understanding of the gold standard system
that collapsed in the 1930s, and the macro-policy responses that characterized government reactions
throughout the region and, for comparison, the world.
Secondly, I will trace the region’s subsequent postwar distortions that descended from the
interventions of the 1930s and evolved within a macro-policy framework that had a high tolerance
for price distortions at the international level. The evidence here will review data on the black
12 See for example Fishlow (1971), Thorp (1992) , Cardoso and Fishlow (1992), Cardoso and Helwege (1992),
Edwards (1995), and Bulmer-Thomas (1994; 1996).
13 In contrast, trade theories offer only an explanation for static losses.7
markets for currency, tariffs, and investment goods prices, to get a general picture of barriers to
accumulation.
Thirdly, I will review analysis of the growth or welfare implications of these distortions. The
overall aim here is to show not only that distortions existed, but that they had negative effects that
were quantitatively and statistically significant. Here I will have time for only a brief survey of the
enormous literature on this topic.
Capital Controls in the 1930s
One almost universal feature of the global economy of the late 19th century was the virtually
complete absence of capital controls. Indeed free migration of labor, and, for the most part, a liberal
regime of low trade barriers was the norm, albeit with some exceptions. This laissez faire economic
orthodoxy reached full expression in capital markets and in the financial world, and in the form of
monetary standards built around the gold standard, fixed exchange rates, free convertibility, and
unfettered movement of capital.
14 In this “golden age” did Keynes’ stereotypical pajama-clad
investor consume breakfast in bed in London whilst telephoning a broker to bid his investments
move hither and yon around the world with out let or hindrance.
15
Governments’ believed their credibility rested on their ability to adhere and sustain this
system, so that even during World War I, the general belief was that return to gold was paramount,
and that the capital controls enacted by various countries, especially the belligerents, were merely a
temporary expedient.
16 The literature on the collapse of the interwar gold standard indicates that
various forces—including crises of expectations, asymmetries in the equilibrating mechanism,
recent memories of hyperinflation in some countries, increased speculation in expanding future
markets, and temptations for competitive devaluation—all rendered the gold standard “unsafe for
use” in the 1920s and 1930s, at least when governments came under increased pressure after 1929
to engage in macroeconomic management to stave off the threat of deflation and depression.
17
In such an imploding world economy, countries on the brink of a crippling gold outflow
had no choice but to take a decision to “break the rules of the game” (or lose all their gold reserves
and have the decision made for them sooner or later). They could turn to a blunt and non-
instantaneous instrument like devaluation to salvage their external balances, or, in more desperate
straits, they could end gold drain by fiat, by imposing capital controls. This breakdown of the old
regime began in the core (with Britain’s departure from gold) in late 1931. As other countries
followed, some chose devaluation, mostly the countries of northwest Europe and its new world
14 See Edelstein (1982), Eichengreen (1992; 1996).
15 Keynes, quoted in Yeager (1976).
16 Einzig (1934), Eichengreen (1992; 1996), Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).
17 Eichengreen (1992; 1996), Temin (1989).8
offshoots; some chose controls, chiefly Germany and its trading partners in central and eastern
Europe. In Latin America, as elsewhere in the periphery, crisis struck much earlier, and many
economies had abandoned the gold standard with devaluations in 1928 and 1929, as their terms of
trade collapsed and payments problems became severe. By the early 1930s, as problems continued,
many were ready to go further and combine devaluations with capital control measures.
Table 3 illustrates the timing of capital controls in Latin America in the 1930s. A clear
dichotomy exist between a group of controllers, including many of the larger countries of the
region, notably the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) and a set of smaller countries in
the region, especially in Central America, all of whom eschewed controls. This division is often
referred to as the partition of the region into “reactive” and “passive” countries, as they were
termed by Díaz Alejandro.
Usually this classification is seen as being principally derived from a response to external
political and economic forces.
18 For example, consider a small Caribbean or Central American
country subject to U.S. foreign policy pressure, perhaps in the form of gunboats, and reliant heavily
on U.S. export markets and finance. This country might be afraid to devalue and enact controls,
18 Díaz Alejandro (1984b).
Table 3
Latin America’s Adoption of Capital Controls as of 1939
Exchange Control, 1930–39 Free Market Activity Black
Country None Begun Abolished Tolerated Controls None Market
Argentina 1931 •
Bolivia 1931 • •
Brazil 1931 •
Chile 1931 •
Colombia 1931 • •
Costa Rica 1932 •
Cuba • •
Dominican Republic • •
Ecuador 1933 1937 •












fearing retaliatory action by the dominant military and economic power in the hemisphere. Indeed,
past experience had shown many countries the lengths to which the U.S. might go to protect its
overseas economic interests. Conversely, larger countries or those more distant from the U.S.
(hence, more powerful and independent), could more easily make the choice to “break the rules”
and deviate from the orthodoxy, even before the U.S. itself did in 1933.
This depiction of Latin American outcomes as being heavily dependent on external forces is
surely relevant in a setting of small, open economies at the periphery, all of whom have little power
to affect global political or economic conditions, most of which they must take as given.
19 And there
are certainly some countries for which the external political costs of policy deviation were very
influential—for example, Cuba or Mexico or Central America under the influence of U.S. foreign
and economic policy. However, as I will argue later, leaving the story here may be too restrictive and
may lean too far toward monocausality in emphasizing external forces as the main determinant of
outcomes in the region.
Postwar Distortions
Why should events of the 1930s interest us when considering the determinants of long-run
economic performance over several decades in Latin America? I will argue that they are of crucial
importance, as one can understand by posing a different question. Was the reactive and passive
response of Latin America’s economies temporary or persistent? If the answer is that they were
persistent then there is something to suggest that the immediate response of the economies to the
1930s crisis was not merely a response to what were transient external economic shocks, but also
revelatory as regards some other characteristics of these countries.
Persistent they were, as we can detect from the nature of postwar distortions in these
economies. After the 1930s the structure of exchange controls varied greatly, and in some places
tariffs replaced or complemented multiple exchange rate regimes. The extent of controls is therefore
best evaluated using multiple criteria relevant to the capital market which pick up various kinds of
distortions, such as black-market premia on the currency, the extent of tariffs, distortions to relative
capital prices, and currency depreciation.
What I claim is that even late in the postwar period, and despite numerous policy changes
along the way by various countries, the basic passive-reactive categorization proposed by Díaz
Alejandro for the 1930s remained relevant. Still decades later the larger and more southerly
countries tended to be the ones with large distortions and interventions; typically, the passive
19 One can envisage a few exceptions, for example Brazil might have some market power in coffee.10
countries of the 1930s, the smaller and more northerly group of countries, had the smaller
distortions. The quantitative evidence appears in Table 4, drawn from another paper.
20
The persistence in policy response should not be too surprising if the response, instead of
being merely a reaction to fleeting adverse external conditions in the crisis of the 1930s, did indeed
reflect deeper characteristics of the polity in each country, that is, internal conditions less subject to
change. There are clear candidates here in the sphere of domestic political conditions. Examples
would include: a country’s degree of democracy; the accessibility or plurality of the government
system, especially for weak or marginal groups; the centralization of power; the general education
of the populace as it might affect demands for representation; and so on. All of these factors could
accentuate political pressure for active intervention.
Moreover, we have some reason to suspect that all of these characteristics more or less fit
into the story, within and beyond Latin America. Arguably, the southern cone countries, by the early
twentieth century, did tend to more closely resemble the core countries, with more developed
educational systems, a more developed democratic tradition, and a broader franchise. In the history
of countries like Argentina, Chile, and Brazil these populist social and political pressures figure
heavily. Yet such pressures should also have had economic consequences, especially in the policy
vacuum of the 1930s following the collapse of the gold standard, and, we guess, in line with the
theories already suggested for these forces as they worked in the core. Conversely, conventional
wisdom suggests, countries in Central America experienced much less populist pressure, had on
average less broadly representative government, and so on—predicting, based on our working
theoretical hypotheses, that they would have had less inclination toward interventions and controls
to temper external forces in the capital market.
Let us take the argument a stage further, for a global comparison, and use an extreme
example for illustration. We can recognize a marked contrast between the populist pressure
20 However, this finding does not contradict earlier quantitative and historical description of the nature of
policy choices in Latin America since the onset of inward-looking strategies in the 1950s. Always in the vanguard
of such policies were countries like the Southern cone group.
Table 4












All Countries 0.27 0.17 0.44 0.10
Asia Pacific 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.02
Latin America 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.37
Southern Cone 0.32 0.27 0.19 0.60
Notes and Source: See Taylor (1998).11
generated in, say, post-1945 Argentina, by the descamisados, assorted unions and corporatists
groups, and all the other lobbies, compared with, say, the almost complete absence of protests,
populism, and political turmoil in a state such as Singapore. The same contrast might well hold for
almost any comparison of the reactive, and even some in the passive group, in Latin America and the
East Asian fast-growing economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Thus the
perspective advanced here, also has a potential power to explain policy outcomes in Latin America
as compared to its usual developing country benchmark, the more economically successful and
more outward-oriented countries of East Asia.
What remains is to see how feasible it is to try to measure and quantify these differences in
politics and regimes, and to see whether the putative relationship with policy outcomes has empirical
content. But first, we will spend a moment just to confirm the ultimate claim that these interventions
and distortions, as they resulted from the domestic political process, did indeed have implications
for economic performance.
Growth Implications
The discussion of the role of capital market interventions and their resulting price distortions would
be irrelevant if it could not be shown that such policies had implications for historical development
experience. The literature on the role of such distortions as a detriment to growth is now very
extensive and does not require extensive recapitulation here.
21 It suffices to record here the relevant
results as applied to the Latin American case. In another paper devoted to this topic, and covering
experience since the 1930s, I have examined the size of distortions, and, for the 1970s and 1980s,
used econometric estimation to figure their importance for investment and economic growth.
22
Table 4 holds the comparative data that show that Latin America’s distortions were much
higher than the Asian group in almost all areas. In the same paper I also showed that this went
along with lower investment rates and growth rates in Latin America versus Asia: for example,
between 1970 and 1990, investment rates in the two regions were 16% versus 23% and growth rates
of per capita income 0.5% versus 3.4%. Econometric counterfactual analysis (not repeated here)
showed that distortions had a paramount and robust role in depressing Latin America’s rate of
accumulation of capital, and hence the rate of growth. All of the difference in investment rates can
be explained by this exercise, and, thus, about half of the implied difference in growth rates.
23
21 See for example De Long (1991), Easterly (1993), Edwards (1992), and Jones (1994). All these studies find a
strong negative correlation between price distortions on the one hand, and investment or growth on the other.
22 See Taylor (1998).
23 It bears repeating that I am not in search of a monocausal explanation here, but I do claim any factors that
can explain between 50% and 100% of Latin America’s retardation in the growth of output and capital demands at
least some attention.12
The purpose of this brief section is merely to motivate the search for the underlying
determinants of these detrimental policies in the political and institutional environment of the
countries themselves. It matters because the reference group, the Asian group, as has been pointed
out before, though initially subject to the a similar inward-looking response as almost every other
economy in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, did eventually reform and embrace policies favoring
integration into the global economy. Latin American countries, almost without exception, did not.
24
Objective distortion measures for the Asian group were little different than the Latin group in the
early postwar period.
25 But after 1970 the differences were marked, as were the different economic
outcomes. The bigger question is how we identify the institutional obstacles that prevented Latin
America from taking the same route to early economic reforms, reforms that are now happening
belatedly and, some critics suggest, only half-heartedly.
26
Summary
Given space constraints, the preceding section has reviewed the evidence on distortions and growth
since the Great Depression. The hope was to persuade the reader, first, that distortions existed, and,
second, that they mattered for long-run economic outcomes. A purely economic analysis might end
here, with an appeal to theory, and further appropriate testing for robustness, to claim that
distortions were somehow causally responsible for the growth outcome. Indeed this has been the
ending point for many such studies, so many that the point is widely accepted.
27
Such an end point is still unsatisfying, for it begs further questions: why did such
distortions emerge in the first place, and why did they persist in the long run? These are implicitly
comparative puzzles, of course, with great bearing on the question of why Latin America’s twentieth
century economic institutions have evolved in such a peculiar fashion as compared to other regions
of the world. To answer them we need to fashion some tool for exploring the political economy of
policy choice in the Great Depression and in the decades that followed.
Political Factors in the Core and Periphery
Beginning with the collapse of the gold standard, Latin America’s macropolicy response began its
long and wayward course, so it is natural to start there. In fact, the good news is that
macroeconomic historians already have proposed some models for understanding the nature of
24 It is the exception that proves the rule, perhaps. The exception might be Chile, which did engage in free-
market reforms in the 1970s. However, this was under a military dictatorship that aimed to squash populist
pressures, and resembling, therefore, the more centralized and autocratic pressures at work in Asian regimes.
25 See Taylor (1998).
26 See Edwards (1995).
27 See for example the earlier cited studies: De Long (1991), Easterly (1993), Edwards (1992), and Jones
(1994).13
macropolicy responses in the 1930s. The model revolves around a simple policy “trilemma” that
confronts policymakers who face pressures from different constituencies to achieve three mutually
inconsistent goals: exchange rate stability, free capital mobility, and macroeconomic stability (e.g.,
“full employment”). Such a theory have been applied mostly to understand the response of the
core economies, notably Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, plus certain other
European and New World economies.
28
The conjecture I wish to advance is that the political economy of institutional changes in the
1930s in the periphery might be understood in more or less the same terms economic historians
have used to discuss the macroeconomic crisis of the gold standard in the core. Such a political-
economy model might thus have universal, global (rather than core-specific) value if it can predict
the “reactive” and “passive” responses by periphery countries to external shocks. The conjecture
seems like a desirable but difficult goal, though in the present paper I can only sketch some ideas
and implications, and fall far short of proof. Should the conjecture apply, it would lend more
credibility and applicability to the theory, and would have intrinsic methodological appeal, as we
place a premium on models that apply to a class of different cases, rather than requiring a different
story for each and every situation.
The model is simply laid out. At the start, under a fixed exchange-rate system, like the gold
standard, and in an open economy with free capital mobility, policymakers have no power to use
monetary policy as an instrument for the manipulation of the domestic economy. Essentially, the
monetary policy is endogenous, as domestic interest rates are set by the world market, and via the
arbitrage actions of the capital. Any attempt to move the interest rate is futile: it would entail the loss
(or gain) of reserves for a temporary (if any) decline (respectively, rise) in domestic interest rates.
Thus was monetary policy depoliticized under the gold standard: no objectives were attainable so
the instrument was never touched.
For the core at least, all this changed, it is argued, with the onset of the Great Depression,
and, preceding it, a gradual but profound change in the power of various constituencies in the
political process, notably the influence of working class groups and parties. Gold standard
orthodoxy had satisfied the interests of bankers, financiers, and others, but ill-served the working
class; in times of boom abroad or bust at home, no attempt could be made by the authorities to
temper the force of recession by easy monetary policy. Consequently, unemployment in crises
could be severe, yet be dismissed as beyond the scope of national economic policy. Such a view is
not taken today, and the turning point was the 1930s. Governments broke the “rules of the game”
and allowed monetary policy into their toolkit. This could happen in two ways: capital controls
could be admitted, allowing monetary policy discretion without risk of capital movement; or a
28 See Eichengreen (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).14
floating exchange-rate system could be introduced, allowing monetary policy to act freely without a
need to defend the parity.
In Europe and the United States, the applicability of this kind of model to historical events
in the core economies is now accepted, based on the seminal work of authors such as Peter Temin
and Barry Eichengreen.
29 Democratic political institutions and the new broadening of the franchise
were realities in the early 20th century, likewise the growing influence of the poor and working
class groups. Only a few economies clung to the gold standard longer than was necessary in the
1930s—the gold bloc of France, Netherlands, and Belgium—and they paid a heavy price in a world
of deflation and economic collapse. By the 1936, all core economies had given up the parity.
30
But what can we say about events at the periphery? Might such a model, if it were a more
general model, not also illuminate the various responses of different countries outside the core? In
particular, can it help us understand the evolution of policies and economic growth in Latin
America? The idea is in marked contrast to explanations based on external conditions: older schools
of thought, such as dependency theory and structuralism, have looked almost exclusively at external
macroeconomic forces as being behind the ruin of the periphery.
31 More recent historical critiques
have challenged these approaches, not just for theoretical and empirical shortcomings, but also for a
lack of attention to microeconomic, institutional, and political developments internal to Latin
America as an explanation for economic outcomes in the long run.
32 A reordering of research
directions is warranted, some argue, to more accurately portray Latin American economic history as
a process conditioned by both internal and external forces.
In this spirit, I will venture to suggest that we reconsider the history of macroeconomic
policy in the same way, and try to understand the 1930s policy responses of the economies as being
potential driven by internal forces. We have seen that there is a theory we can even take off the
shelf: we can apply the same analytical devices to describe the core economies. Their treatment
suggests that the path chosen by policymakers is explicable in terms of domestic politics. Thus, for
example, the theory we have predicts that rising democratic and pluralistic forces raised the
likelihood of deviation from the gold standard.
33 The question for Latin American history is this:
can we detect such a link between domestic politics and policy outcomes? And, does it matter for
only the 1930s, or can it also explain policy persistence?
29 For more detail see Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989).
30 See Eichengreen (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).
31 See Cardoso and Helwege (1992) for an overview of such ideas associated with the Structuralists.
32 For a trenchant critique see Haber (1997b).
33 An example would be France in the 1920s, and the demands of various class groups that the fiscal burden be
shifted, producing stalemate and delaying a return to the gold standard. Another example would be Britain in the
1920s, and the miners’ strikes and general strikes in response to the strictures of a tight monetary policy designed
to deflate the price level towards its purchasing-power-parity level with the pound overvalued at resumption.15
In order to explore this hypothesis we need to quantify two features of economic
developments and political institutions since the 1930s. First, we need measures of policy response
at various junctures, such as capital controls, black market activity, and price distortions. Second, we
need the much more subjective measures of political institutions that will tell us something about
how susceptible economic policies were to broad democratic forces in general, and the influence of
less-privileged groups in general. To make the challenge harder, we need these measures for many
countries at many different points in time.
In terms of measuring policies we have already seen a wide range of data. We can see which
countries enacted controls in the 1930s, and how these policies evolved into multifaceted distortions
by the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.
34 Thus we can provide measures of policy response. In terms of
measuring political institutions we are on more difficult ground, as expected. However, the results
of the Polity project can be employed here.
35 The Polity database supplies annual data series on
regime type and political authority for 177 countries since 1800, series that include measures of
democracy, autocracy, the breadth of the political process and its accessibility to various groups, and
so on. Combining all the political and economic data, we can try to explore how political conditions
shaped macropolicy response in the 1930s and after.
Looking first at the 1930s, if we seek evidence that the core-type of gold-standard political
economy model might function as a model for the periphery then we need evidence that passive and
reactive states were distinguished by very different internal domestic political characteristics. Since
reactive in Latin America is synonymous with capital controls, it suffices to look for systematic
differences between control and non-control countries in Latin America. Table 5, Panel (a), shows
that the Polity III database can detect a difference between the two groups, and one consistent with
the theory. The passive non-control countries were more autocratic and centralized, and had less
constraint on executive power, less regular and competitive participation in the political process, and
less democratic regimes. All of this left them less exposed to populist pressure in the theory.
Conversely, the reactive group had much more scope for popular pressure to feed into the political
and economic decision making process. Panel (b) confirms the relationship by looking not at
means, but at correlations amongst the variables in the Latin American sample.
34 The application of the trilemma idea to Latin America may appear not so straightforward. We have noted
already that for many countries in the region, an initial attempt to resolve the trilemma through devaluation
proved insufficient, and many then turned to controls as an auxiliary device. In general, the trilemma must be seen
as encompassing “mixed strategies” of this sort: partial use of both devaluation and capital control tools may,
jointly, suffice to relieve tensions. It is a matter of judgment, then, to decide which constraint is really binding, and
therefore which policy move was critical. Implicitly, I am taking the position that if, in the 1930s, the floating rate
proved insufficient to solve the tensions, perhaps because it was a dirty float as was often the case, and controls
were in the end necessary, then this constituted a controls-based strategy, as opposed to a true floating rate strategy
with free capital mobility.
35 See Jaggers and Gurr (1995). The data was downloaded from ICPSR, file 6695.16
The correlations tell a similar story, and help us identify strongly collinear characteristics:
e.g., autocracy is almost exactly opposite to democracy in many cases. Panel (b) also looks at the
correlation of the political variables with the economic policy outcomes, both controls the extent of
devaluation. For the most part, the clearer correlations are between political variables and control
outcomes: this is not surprising, as almost all countries were forced to devalue it was only with
respect to capital controls that differences emerged. Panel (c) examines the statistical fit of the
relationship for the most promising candidates, the variables PARCOMP and DEMOC. The latter,
a democracy measure, fares poorly, but the former does better, especially in explaining the
imposition of controls, the definitive policy of the reactive group of countries. This is good news for
the theory, for in the Polity III database, the PARCOMP variable measures “the extent to which
Table 5
Politics and Capital Controls in Latin America in the 1930s
(a) Political Variables for Control and Non-Control Countries in Latin America
CONTROL AUTOC DEMOC XCONST PARREG PARCOMP CENT
0 4.00 1.63 2.50 2.63 1.88 1.25
1 3.25 2.92 3.33 3.33 3.17 1.17
(b) Correlations of Political Variables with Controls and Devaluation in Latin America
AUTOC DEMOC XCONST PARREG PARCOMP CENT CONTROL DEVAL
AUTOC 1.000
DEMOC -0.712 1.000
XCONST -0.721 0.730 1.000
PARREG 0.217 0.322 0.345 1.000
PARCOMP -0.419 0.588 0.554 0.588 1.000
CENT 0.064 -0.185 0.000 -0.016 0.091 1.000
CONTROL -0.156 0.251 0.289 0.339 0.496 -0.068 1.000
DEVAL -0.413 -0.052 0.112 -0.593 0.338 0.322 -0.092 1.000
(C) Regression model: Controls and Devaluation with Political Variables in Latin America
CONTROL CONTROL DEVAL DEVAL
PARCOMP 0.19 — 3.78 —
(2.42) (1.14)
DEMOC — 0.05 — -0.24
(1.10) (0.16)
R SQUARED .246 .063 .114 .003
Notes and Sources: Political variables are for 1929 and are taken from the Polity III database. AUTOC is a
measure of autocracy, from 0 to 10; DEMOC is a measure of democracy, from 0 to 10; XCONST is a measure of
constraints on the executive from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive party or subordination); PARREG is a
measure of the regulation of participation in the political process from 0 (unregulated) to 5 (institutionalized);
PARCOMP is a measure of the competitiveness of participation, from 0 (unregulated) to 5 (competitive); CENT
is a measure of centralization of state authority, from 1 (unitary) to 3 (federal). The economic variables are from
Bratter (CONTROL) and the League of Nations Yearbooks (DEVAL). CONTROLS takes the value 1 if controls
were applied in the 1930s, 0 otherwise. DEVAL is equal to the percentage devaluation of the currency relative to
gold parity as of January 1935.17
non-elites are able to access institutional structures of political expression.” I think this variable
most succinctly summarizes the extent of sociopolitical tensions that lie at the heart of the
Eichengreen model of reaction against the gold standard in core economies as it was driven by
newly enfranchised groups ready and able to challenge the old orthodoxy. The finding here is that
similar forces are discernible in a set of peripheral economies too. Although quantitative and
significance appears weak at present, the results are novel in that they support this well established
theory from the core in a new geographical setting, and they might be viewed as surprisingly good
since the political data are essentially so subjective and prone to error. It is also reassuring that
although the political variables were collected for a project to track democracy and peace, they do in
fact have some relation to other political outcomes, here in the realm of economic policy.
It might be satisfactory if the story ended here, but we can also ask the data to tell us much
more. We know that the reactive policies of the 1930s persisted for decades. A tougher test is the
following: can the political data give any prediction of economic policy outcomes in the postwar
era? Table 6 suggests they can, and still in line with the theory. Moreover, at the later date we can
start to make some inter-regional comparisons. The table rows show three groups of countries that
are of interest circa 1970. First, we have the three successful fast-growing Asian NICs. Then we
have the historically passive Latin American group, and finally the reactive Latin American group,
with the distinction here based on 1930s policy response. It is evident that reactive policies tended
to persist: the various distortion measures are clearly higher for the reactive group. Distortions are
very low in the NIC3 group as expected. As for the relationship of these economic policy outcomes,
it is apparent that the subsamples more prone to populist pressures do experience more distortions:
less democratic and less competitive participation in the political process of the NICs is the
Table 6
Politics and Distortions in Latin America and the Asian NICs in 1970
DEMOC70 PARCOMP70 PARCOMP29 BMP70 OWTI OWQI PPI70DEV
NIC3 1.00 2.00 — 0.05 0.08 0.16 -0.17
LATIN
PASSIVE
2.64 2.45 1.88 0.21 0.17 0.22 -0.02
LATIN
REACTIVE
3.75 3.00 3.17 0.34 0.23 0.28 0.20
Notes and Sources: For classification, NIC3 is South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Hong Kong is omitted as
political variables are not available for this non-sovereign state), LATIN PASSIVE are the group of countries who
did not enact controls in the 1930s, LATIN REACTIVE is the group that did based on Bratter. DEMOC70 is the
democracy measure (0 to 10) for 1970, PARCOMP70 and PARCOMP29 are the competitiveness of participation
measures (0 to 5) for 1970 and 1929, and these three variables are from Polity III. BMP70 is the black market
premium in 1970, OWTI the tariff incidence, OWQI the quota incidence, and PPI70DEV the percentage deviation of
the relative price of investment goods from the world level, and these distortion measures are from Sachs and
Warner.18
accompaniment to non-interventionist policy. Passive Latin American countries come next with
more populist pressures, and more intervention. Lastly the reactive group has high levels of
democracy and competitive participation in the political process. Following our previous finding it
is tempting now to see whether this same pattern holds vis-à-vis the 1930s political situation.
Choosing one variable, competitive participation, we do find a similar result (in the 1930s none of
the NICs existed so this finding applies only to passive-versus-active Latin America).
The results of this section are, of course, very tentative. Few of the relationships will safely
submit to more sophisticated testing, as we push the limits of small sample size and subjective data
construction. For the most part I just focus on means and levels of variable and not on a specific
econometric model. It is enough to illustrate, I hope, the potential for a political-economy model of
macropolicy applied to the periphery just as it has been applied by economic historians studying the
core.
Lessons for Today
This paper tries to carve out a new area of understanding in twentieth century Latin American
economic history, focusing on the great shift in policy objectives after the Great Depression. I have
argued that peripheral economies were subject to the same kinds of populist pressures seen in the
core, and, accordingly, policy outcomes depended to some extent on the political institutional
framework that prevailed at the time of the interwar crisis. This is revealed by the heterogeneity of
policy response within Latin America, and in the persistence of that response in the postwar period.
Even in the 1960s and 1970s, the same patterns were visible in reactive and passive economies, and
a comparison with East Asian outcomes only underscores the result.
However, there are certainly sufficient gaps in this analysis to make it only provisional.
More research is surely needed on a case by case bases to indentify the links between external
constraints, populist pressure, and the mechanics of policy choice. I would also stress that the
macroeconomic focus of the paper should not be read as implying an absence of concern for
microeconomic foundations. All of the aggregate distortions seen, and the policies behind them, are
ultimately built on sets of specific interventions designed to raise transactions costs or otherwise
throw sand in the wheels of markets, contracts, and free trading. These fundamental issues echo the
literature on transaction costs, incentive structures, and the persistence of imperfect institutions due
to interest-group action, rent seeking, path dependence, and so on. Finally, a major issue, beyond the
scope of the paper but exceedingly important, concerns the origins of pre-1929 political institutions
in determining subsequent outcomes. We must look back further in the political history of Latin
America to better understand why the particular forms of democracy, elections, centralization, and19
representation evolved to where they were in the 1920s, and why they varied as they did across
space and time.
 36 In this regard we should also mention the problem of distinguishing the present
approach from a traditional view based on U.S. foreign policy strength as an external determinant
of policy reactions in the 1930s: it is true that the more undemocratic and passive countries tend to
be those closest to U.S. influence.
Even with all these caveats, this paper makes a first attempt at extending some ideas of core
economic history to the periphery. It must recognize some important distinctions, given the focus
on capital markets: in the capital-scarce periphery individuals, groups, and states faced very different
costs and benefits from interventions in the capital market. For this reason, the analysis suggested
here is in some ways at odds with the core model.
37
A first implication of the hypothesis suggested here is that we need to make some revisions
to our understanding of the balance of internal and external economic and political forces as they
affected the evolution of Latin American macropolicies after the 1930. But the intent is not to
replace a monocausal externally-oriented theory with a monocausal internally-oriented theory. A
role for both is needed. Whilst small semi-open economies like those in the region will never be
able to totally escape the implications of global economic forces entirely, it is not necessarily true
that this means that economic outcomes are shaped entirely by outside forces. To a very great
extent, macropolicies since the 1930s have evolved in line with Díaz Alejandro’s passive-reactive
categorization, but this evolution is traceable in large part to the nature of domestic political
institutions in the various countries. The more reactive economies were those more subject to the
kinds of populist pressures that generated greater deviations from the gold standard in the 1930s in
the core, suggesting a universal theory of policy reaction in the Depression years in both the core
and the periphery. Latin America differed in the way this policy response persisted into the 1970s
and 1980s, whereas some other developing countries (for example, the Asian group) were able to
reform these policies much sooner.
A second implication is that economists, historians, and political scientists can use the
laboratory of economic history to assess the interaction of democratic political tensions and policy
outcomes. This is a controversial subject, with influential work arising from economists such as
Alberto Alesina, Dani Rodrik, and Robert Barro. Barro’s alarming claim that too much democracy
36 On groups, politics, institutions, and growth see Olson (1968; 1982) and North (1990). North has
emphasized the long-run impact of centralized, undemocratic Spanish colonial institutions on Latin American
development. As we see by the twentieth century, a populist form of politics had evolved in some countries that
was important in determining later twentieth century outcomes. See Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).
37 In the postwar period it would seem that, say, Europe was as susceptible to populist pressure given its
democratic foundations. Did postwar Europe fail economically like Latin America? No. But that pressure, as
mediated via the trilemma, could not could off vital supplies of foreign capital as in a periphery situation—though
by creating other rigidities it could have had important growth-reducing implications in some areas of the
economy. See Olson (1982).20
may be bad for economic growth is certainly echoed in history, and in more than just a partial
correlation of democracy indicators and growth outcomes. Indeed, investigations along the lines of
the model suggested here can take us beyond the surface level findings of reduced-form growth
empirics and into some of the more detailed mechanisms by which political structure affects policy
choices and hence growth.
History is also a key testing ground, and affords a more detailed picture of such a process at
work. The policy response of the core in the 1930s was certainly driven by populist pressures
demanding an end to the gold standard and the laissez-faire macroeconomic economic orthodoxy
of the day, as emphasized by Temin and Eichengreen.
38 The present paper argues that no less
affected in this way were the economies of the periphery. Critical here though was an analysis that
did not just end in the 1930s, but which followed the response in the postwar era. Reactive policies
were very successful in averting depression in the 1930s, both in the core and periphery.
39 But the
legacy of the Great Depression and persisted up to fifty or more years in Latin America, and this
paper suggest that populism in the realm of domestic politics was a key cause.
40
It would be an exaggeration, not to say dangerous, to suggest that these results in any way
devalue the worth of a democratic society, which has so many non-pecuniary welfare benefits. But
history suggests we should not get overoptimistic about the irreversibility of the current wave of
economic reform and global integration, both in the core and periphery. We need a real
understanding of the potential power of popular will and political means to derail the process, as
happened in the 1930s. Recent reforms aim to undo the last sixty years of isolation and reintegrate
Latin America into the global economy, but they are not guaranteed to succeed, and face many of
the same challenges. For example, in seeking price stability via fixed exchange rates and gold-
standard-type currency boards, the economies of Latin America, and now East Asia, are exposing
themselves to the full brunt of the macroeconomic trilemma.
Economists have warned for many years of the constraints on growth and efficiency caused
by the closure of an economy to outside influences. This message about the constraints of
closedness seems to have been appreciated of late by politicians and the public: economic reforms
have advanced and the world economy has achieved greater integration. But in the present climate
have the constraints of openness been adequately understood by politicians and the public? History
teaches us that the choice to embrace globalization, and all the benefits and costs that such a choice
entails, has always meant hard choices in times of crisis, and in the present day we should expect no
different. Collapsing financial systems, hard monetary rules, and freely mobile capital were all
38 See Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989)
39 See Campa (1990) and Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).
40 Alesina (1992), Barro (1994) Rodrik (1995; 1996; 1997).21
ingredients of an anti-globalization reaction six decades ago. In the end, and under popular
pressure, policymakers untied their hands in the 1930s, and have been using them ever since.
All that said, few would say the democratic political process should be sacrificed to evade
these tensions. Instead this paper indicates that policymakers, and their constituencies, face a
responsibility to find an informed position to understand the short and long-term implications of
their actions, and here economic history has its part to play.
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